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ROBRENO, District Judge. 
 Christopher McCalla petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal.  McCalla argues a full and unconditional gubernatorial 
pardon extinguished the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction.  
He also argues the applicable Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provisions 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  We disagree and will 
therefore deny the petition for review.    
I.  Background 
McCalla, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 1990 
as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure and overstayed his visa.  He has a U.S. citizen 
spouse and U.S. citizen children.  In 2005, McCalla was arrested by the Pennsylvania state 
police for possession of marijuana.  He pled guilty in state court to the offense.  
McCalla was subsequently placed in removal proceedings as a result of his 
overstay.  In 2008, he applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status 
pursuant to Section 240A(b)(1) of the INA, which permits the Attorney General to cancel 
removal and adjust the immigration status of aliens who, among other things, have been 
physically present in the United States for at least ten years and whose removal would 
result in hardship to an immediate family member.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  
However, McCalla’s marijuana conviction rendered him statutorily ineligible for 
cancellation relief or adjustment of status.  See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).   
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In 2019, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf fully and unconditionally pardoned 
McCalla for the controlled substance conviction.  McCalla informed the BIA of the 
pardon and argued he was now eligible for cancellation of removal because he was no 
longer “convicted” of the offense.  The BIA disagreed, concluding that McCalla’s 
conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal despite the gubernatorial 
pardon.  This timely appeal followed. 
II.  Discussion  
 We have jurisdiction over final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  We review legal questions concerning the interpretation of the INA de 
novo.  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 On appeal, McCalla raises two arguments.  First, he argues the gubernatorial 
pardon extinguishes the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction. 
Second, he argues the INA’s disparate treatment of aliens convicted of drug possession 
offenses violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  We consider and 
reject these arguments in turn. 
A. Gubernatorial Pardon 
McCalla’s argument that a gubernatorial pardon extinguishes the immigration  
consequences of his conviction is foreclosed by this Court’s recent opinion in Aristy-Rosa 
v. Attorney General United States, 994 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2021).  
Aristy-Rosa involved a petitioner who was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident.  Id. at 113.  Several years later, he was convicted of attempted 
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criminal sale of cocaine, in violation of New York state law.  Id.  He then received a 
Notice to Appear in the Immigration Court, which charged him with being subject to 
removal under the INA because (1) he had committed a crime relating to a controlled 
substance, (2) the controlled substance conviction constituted an aggravated felony, and 
(3) he was inadmissible at the time of his application for adjustment of status.  Id. at 113-
14.  After New York Governor Andrew Cuomo pardoned his controlled substance 
conviction, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing the pardon 
eliminated the basis for his removal.  Id. at 114.  The Immigration Judge denied the 
motion, the BIA dismissed the appeal, and the petitioner petitioned this Court for review.  
Id. 
On appeal, we noted that the INA contains an express provision addressing the 
effect of gubernatorial pardons on certain deportable aliens.  Id. at 115.  Pursuant to that 
provision, crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and high-speed flight cannot 
serve as the basis for removing an alien who has received a full and unconditional pardon 
by the President or a state governor for those crimes.  Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi)).  However, “Congress did not explicitly provide that a full pardon for 
a controlled substance conviction extinguishes the immigration consequences of that 
offense.”  Id.  We therefore concluded that, under the plain text of the statute, the 
petitioner’s pardon eliminated the aggravated felony ground for his removal but not the 
controlled substance ground.  Id. 
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Here, too, McCalla is ineligible for a waiver because the statute’s express waiver 
provision does not apply to him.  First, like the petitioner in Aristy-Rosa, McCalla was 
convicted of a controlled substance offense, which the pardon waiver provision does not 
cover.  See id.  Second, even if the waiver did cover a controlled substance offense, the 
provision applies only to immigrants who are deportable and would not waive the grounds 
for McCalla’s inadmissibility.1  See Balogun v. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 
2005) (“Section 1182 does not have a pardon provision like section 1227 does, and we 
believe that if Congress had intended to extend the pardon waiver to inadmissible aliens, it 
would have done so.”); see also Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“[The petitioner’s] state pardon does not entitle him to a waiver that does not 
exist in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).”). 
Accordingly, McCalla’s gubernatorial pardon did not extinguish the immigration 
consequences of his controlled substance conviction. 
B.  Fourteenth Amendment 
 
1   Aliens are deportable if they “are either (1) eligible to enter when they arrive and 
are admitted, but become ineligible to remain because of some later event, or (2) . . . were 
admitted, but would not have been had their inadmissible status been known at the time of 
admission.”  Aristy-Rosa, 994 F.3d at 115 n.3 (quoting Balogun v. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 
1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2005)).  In contrast, “inadmissibility applies to those aliens who, for 
one reason or another, are ineligible to enter or re-enter the United States in the first 
place.”  Id. (quoting Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1362).  McCalla’s controlled substance 




McCalla’s equal protection challenge to the applicable INA provisions fails 
because there is a rational basis for limiting the pardon waiver to the categories of crimes 
enumerated in the statute.  As we noted in Aristy-Rosa, “[s]ome controlled substance 
offenses are also aggravated felonies, . . . but not all aggravated felonies involve 
controlled substances.  Congress could have rationally decided that controlled substance 
offenses warrant removal because of the impact such crimes have on the entire 
community.”  994 F.3d at 116 (citing In re Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626, 627-28 (B.I.A. 
2003)). 
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
